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Abstract: Deteriorating public finances around the world raise doubts about countries’ abilities to bail out 
their largest banks. For an international sample of banks, this paper investigates the impact of government 
indebtedness and deficits on bank stock prices and CDS spreads. Overall, bank stock prices reflect a 
negative capitalization of government debt and they respond negatively to deficits. We present evidence that 
in 2008 systemically large banks saw a reduction in their market valuation in countries running large fiscal 
deficits. Furthermore, the change in bank CDS spreads in 2008 relative to 2007 reflects countries’ 
deterioration of public deficits. Our results suggest that some systemically important banks can increase 
their value by downsizing or splitting up, as they have become too big to save, potentially reversing the 
trend to ever larger banks. We also document that a smaller proportion of banks are systemically important - 
relative to GDP - in 2008 than in the two previous years, which could reflect these private incentives to 
downsize. 
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1. Introduction 
In the years leading up to the current financial crisis, banks around the world expanded their balance 
sheets to increase profitability in an environment of cheap funding. Access to international funding made it 
possible for individual banks and overall banking systems to reach enormous size relative to their countries’ 
GDP. The prime example is Iceland where the liabilities of the overall banking system reached around 9 
times GDP at the end of 2007, before a spectacular collapse of the banking system in 2008.
2 By the end of 
2008, the liabilities of publicly-listed banks in Switzerland and the United Kingdom had reached 6.3 and 5.5 
times their GDP. Liabilities of banks in Belgium, Denmark France, Ireland, and the Netherlands similarly 
exceeded two times their GDP. At the end of 2008, we identified 30 publicly-listed banks worldwide with 
liabilities exceeding half of their country’s GDP. Twelve of these had total liabilities exceeding 1 trillion US 
dollars. 
  These huge banks have assets well over $100 billion, far exceeding the technologically optimal size 
of around $25 billion found by Berger et al. (1997) on the basis of US data. Huge banks are no doubt 
difficult to manage effectively, and huge size may yield few additional risk diversification benefits. Banks 
may have grown this large in part because bank managers see their stature and pay increase with bank size. 
Alternatively, bank growth has been motivated by a desire to reach too-big-to-fail status, implying lower 
funding cost. Banks perhaps can increase their implicit claim on the financial safety net by ever increasing 
their size under normal business cycle conditions and in the absence of a major financial crisis. The 
financial and economic crisis that started in 2008, however, has been unexpectedly deep with a severe 
deterioration of the public finances so far and projected in the years to come. This raises doubts about 
countries’ ability and determination to save their largest banks. At the very least, financially strapped 
                                                   
2 The liabilities of Glitner Bank, Kaupthing Bank and Landsbanki together were 9.0 times Icelandic GDP in 2007.  3
governments may be forced to resolve any future large-bank failures in a relatively cheap way, implying 
large losses to bank creditors.
3 
  This paper investigates the impact of a country’s public finances, in the form of government debt 
and deficits, on expected returns to bank shareholders as discounted in bank stock prices, making a 
distinction between systemically important and smaller banks. In a parallel fashion, we also consider the 
impact of government finances on expected losses on banks’ liabilities, as reflected in the 5-year credit 
default swap (CDS) spreads. Specifically, we consider bank valuation over the 1991-2008 period, with 717 
publicly-listed banks in 34 countries in 2008, and CDS spreads over the 2001-2008 period, with 59 banks in 
20 countries in 2008.  
Our results on the implications of bank size and government finances for bank stock valuation are as 
follows. A bank’s market-to-book ratio is found to be positively related to the absolute size of its assets, 
while there is some evidence of a negative relationship between the market-to-book ratio and a bank’s total 
liabilities-to-GDP ratio, as an indicator of systemic importance. For the overall sample, we further find that 
the bank market-to-book ratio is negatively related to government debt and deficits. The negative 
capitalization of government debt and deficits into bank share prices suggests that the expected 
consequences of higher public debts, which could be due to a combination of higher future taxation and 
lower future banking subsidies through the financial safety net, negatively affect returns to shareholders.  
For our overall sample, we fail to find that bank valuation of systemically important banks is 
relatively sensitive to a country’s public finances. At a time of financial crisis in 2008, however, we find 
that bank valuation of systemically large banks responds more negatively to a deterioration of the public 
deficit. This indicates that during a crisis distressed public finances reduce bank valuation through a less 
                                                   
3 At a time of severe financial crisis, countries’ ability to guarantee bank liabilities may be at least as important as 
their formal guarantees. In the recent crisis, many countries provided explicit guarantees of many non-deposit 
liabilities and they have extended deposit insurance. Explicit deposit insurance of some kind already was almost 
universal prior to the current crisis (see Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (eds.), 2008).  4
generous financial safety net, rather than just through the prospect of higher future bank taxation. In 
particular, subsidies through the financial safety net to systemically large banks appear to be reduced 
relatively more by weak public finances. This indicates that at a time of crisis systemically large banks are 
too big to save.   
Government finance variables do not materially affect bank CDS spreads over the 2001-2008 sample 
period. However, we find that the increase in bank CDS spreads between 2007 and 2008 is significantly 
related to the deterioration of the public deficit, as evidence that expected credit losses on bank liabilities 
reflect the public finances during a severe financial crisis. Moreover, we find that CDS spreads are 
positively related to the fiscal cost relative to GDP of resolving any previous banking crisis. Thus, investors 
in bank liabilities appear to expect larger losses in countries that experienced costly banking crises before. 
We also consider the pricing of bank risk, as measured by the volatility of weekly bank stock 
returns, into bank stock prices and CDS spreads, separately for systemically large and small banks. We find 
that the share prices of systemically large banks are more positively related to bank risk, while CDS spreads 
of systemically large banks are more negatively related to bank risk. This suggests that a marginal increase 
in bank risk increases the implicit subsidy from the financial safety net relatively more for systemically 
large banks – after controlling for systemic size and government finances. These results are in line with the 
view that systemically large banks are too large to fail.  
Overall, we find that a systemically large bank may benefit relatively more from taking on more risk, 
while it can also lose relatively more from being in a country that runs large government deficits at a time of 
financial crisis. This makes the net benefit of systemic size ambiguous. It also suggests that some banks – 
particularly those with limited risk and located in high-deficit countries – may have grown beyond the size 
that maximizes their implicit subsidy from the financial safety net. Such banks can increase shareholder 
value by downsizing or splitting up. For our overall sample, estimated coefficients imply that the share  5
prices of the average systemically important bank are discounted 22.3 percent on account of systemic size, 
providing strong incentives to reduce bank size relative to the national economy. Our data indicate that a 
smaller proportion of banks are systemically important - relative to GDP - in 2008 than in the two previous 
years, which could reflect private incentives to downsize. 
This paper is related to several others that have considered the impact of bank size on bank stock 
returns and bank liabilities. In 1984, the US Comptroller of the Currency in testimony before Congress 
argued that a group of 11 large banks were ’too big to fail’ (TBTF) and that for those banks total deposit 
insurance would be provided. Using an event study methodology for a sample 63 US banks, O’Hara and 
Shaw (1990) find that there are positive wealth effects accruing to these TBTF banks, while there are 
negative wealth effects accruing to the smaller banks. 
  The positive wealth effect of TBTF suggests that a bank merger that creates a bank that is TBTF can 
create wealth for bank shareholders. Considering US bank mergers over the 1991-1998 period, Kane (2000) 
finds that stockholders of large-bank acquirers have gained value when a deposit institution target is large 
and even more value when a deposit institution target was previously headquartered in the same state. 
Benston, Hunter and Wall (1995) similarly find that bank mergers and acquisitions are in part motivated by 
enhancing the deposit insurance put option. 
  Moreover, the benefits of gaining TBTF status following bank mergers are not limited to 
stockholders.  Penas and Unal (2004) consider the returns to bond holders around US bank mergers in the 
1991-1997 period. These authors find that adjusted returns of merging banks’ bonds are positive across pre-
merger and announcement months. These positive returns are attributed to gaining TBTF status, in addition 
to diversification gains and, to a lesser extent, synergy gains.    
  All of these papers have aimed to identify an impact of TBTF by considering the differential pricing 
of bank stock and liabilities for large and small banks. Alternatively, an impact of TBTF on bank liability  6
pricing can be ascertained by comparing the pricing of bank liabilities over different periods, during which 
TBTF is supposed to hold to different extents. In this vein, Flannery and Sorescu (1996) consider the 
determination of spreads on bank subordinated debentures over different subperiods during the years 1983-
1991.
4 These spreads should reflect bank-specific risk indicators less during times of greater likelihood of 
application of TBTF policies. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) specifically find that spreads reflect bank risk 
indicators relatively less during the last three years of the 1983-1991 period, since after 1998 many bank and 
thrift debenture holders had suffered losses during bank failures signaling a lowered adherence to TBTF.  
Similarly, Sironi (2003) considers the sensitivity of spreads of European banks’ subordinated notes 
and debentures during the 19991-2001 period and finds that these spreads are relatively insensitive to bank 
risk in the second part of the 1990s, consistent with a disappearing perception of TBTF type guarantees on 
the part of investors. Sironi (2003) attributes the apparent diminution of TBTF in Europe during the 1990s 
to the joint effect of the loss of monetary policy by national central banks and the public budget constraints 
imposed by the European Monetary Union.  
The TBTF literature essentially investigates the authorities’ need or desire to provide more support 
for relatively large banks on the assumption that governments are able to do so. Brown and Dinç (2009) is 
the first paper to provide evidence that a country’s ability to support its financial sector, as reflected in its 
public deficit, affects its treatment of distressed banks. These authors consider government takeover or 
closure decisions of banks in 21 emerging market economies during the 1990s. As expected, a bank is more 
likely to be taken over or closed by the government, if its own capital ratio is low. However, is it less likely 
to be taken over, if the average capital ratio of other banks in the same country is low as well. This is taken 
to be evidence of ‘too many to fail,’ as the state may be unable to close many weak banks simultaneously. 
                                                   
4 This paper is part of a literature that considers whether yields on bank bonds and also stock prices adequately 
reflect bank risk, as reflected in accounting data, supervisory data, or subsequent credit downgrades (see Gropp, 
Vesala and Vulpes (2006) for an overview).  7
Interestingly, the ‘too many to fail’ effect is relatively weak in countries with high public budget balances. 
While Brown and Dinç (2009) find that countries with weak public finances are slow to close weak banks, it 
does not follow that banks in fact benefit from being in countries with weak public finances, since the 
counties may in the end be forced to adopt cheap resolution methods, implying large losses to bank 
creditors.  
Differentiating between systeminally important and other banks, we consider the impact of the 
public finances on bank stock prices and CDS spreads, reflecting the net effect of potentially different 
timing and resolution method decisions. Our results indicate a negative effect of higher debt or deficits on 
bank stock prices, for the first time documenting how the state of public finances may limit net subsidies to 
the banking sector. This ‘too large to save’ effect is consistent with the observed downsizing of banks that 
has been occurring in recent years.  
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data. Section 3 outlines 
the empirical strategy and presents the results. Section 4 concludes.  
2. The  data 
  This section describes data on the size of bank liabilities relative to national economies as 
well as other variables used in this study.  
2.1.  The size of bank liabilities 
In this study, we consider an international sample of banks over the 1991-2008 period. 
Accounting data on bank liabilities and other variables are taken from Bankscope. Our sample of 
banks excludes banks that are categorized as investment banks or securities houses. Also, we 
restrict ourselves to banks that are publicly-listed to ensure data quality and to enhance 
comparability across countries. The largest banks in most countries tend to be publicly-traded. 
As a measure of systemic size, we take the ratio of a bank’s total liabilities to national 
GDP, denoted Liabilities (see the Appendix for variable definitions and data sources). This 
reflects that in practice often a bank’s total liabilities, rather than just insured deposits, are  8
honored in a bank bail-out. For 2008, we have identified 30 publicly-listed banks worldwide with 
liabilities in excess of half of their country’s GDP. These major banks are listed in Table 1. UBS, 
a Swiss bank, had a liabilities-to-GDP ratio of 3.7, followed by ING of the Netherlands with an 
analogous ratio of 2.2, and Credit Suisse of Switzerland with a ratio of 2.1. Among these 
systemically large banks, the largest banks in terms of absolute liabilities were Barclays, BNP 
Paribas, Deutsche Bank and Royal Bank of Scotland, each with liabilities exceeding 2.5 trillion 
US dollars.  
The world’s largest banks tend to be international banks with large shares of assets and 
liabilities located in foreign branches and subsidiaries. In these instances, the home-country 
fiscal authorities tend to remain responsible wholly or in part for insuring the bank’s liabilities 
and for paying for any bail-out. In the European Economic Area (including the European Union, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway), bank deposits located at foreign branches are formally 
covered by the deposit insurance scheme of the home country, according to the EU directive on 
deposit insurance adopted in 1994. Furthermore, the EU directive on the reorganization and 
winding-up of credit institutions adopted in 2001 requires that domestic and foreign bank 
creditors are treated equally in bankruptcy proceedings, preventing selective bail-outs of only 
domestic bank liability holders. The distinction between foreign branches and subsidiaries in 
practice is often blurred, as international banks formally guarantee the liabilities of their foreign 
subsidiaries, or they de facto have to guarantee these liabilities to prevent reputational loss in 
case of a foreign-subsidiary insolvency. 
As a measure of banking system size, we can compute ratio of banking-system liabilities 
to national GDP. Switzerland and the UK have the largest ratios of banking system total 
liabilities to GDP of 6.3 and 5.5 respectively, as seen in Table 2. The table further shows that 13 
European countries are among the 20 countries with the largest ratios of banking-system 
liabilities to GDP. 
Table 3 provides additional information on the distribution of systemically important 
banks internationally in 2008. Country coverage in the table is restricted to those countries for  9
which information on central government indebtedness or the fiscal balance is available from the 
IMF or the OECD. Columns 1 and 2 of the table first provide information on banking-system 
liabilities relative to GDP and on the largest bank’s liabilities relative to GDP for this larger set 
of countries. Next, column 3 provides the total number of publicly-listed banks in 2008. The US 
stands out with a rather large number of 464 banks. The next four columns indicate how many 
banks are systemically large in that their liabilities-to-GDP ratio exceeds 0.1, 0.25, 0.5 and 1.0, 
respectively.  
Several countries are seen to have highly concentrated banking systems with rather few 
but very large banks relative to GDP. Ireland, for instance, has three publicly-listed banks that all 
have liabilities exceeding half of GDP, while Belgium has three publicly-listed banks of which 
two have liabilities that exceed GDP. At the other extreme, the US has a highly dispersed 
banking system with only three banks that have a liabilities-to-GDP ratio exceeding 0.1. These 
three banks are Citigroup, Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase, with the latter bank having 
the highest liabilities-to-GDP ratio for any US bank of 0.14.  
The final two columns of the table provide the country’s central government debt to GDP 
ratio and its budget balance relative to GDP. Belgium, Greece, and Italy are shown to be 
countries with several systemically large banks and a high debt-to-GDP ratio of at least 0.9. 
Ireland, on the other hand, similarly has several systemically large banks, but its debt-to-GDP 
ratio is relatively low at 0.27. 
The huge size of many countries’ largest banks reflects that many banks’ liabilities have 
grown faster than GDP over the last two decades. This is evident in Figure 1. This figure 
displays the percentages of large banks that are defined as systemic by their liabilities-to-GDP 
ratios in excess of various benchmarks for each of the years since 1991. The percentages of 
systemically large banks reached a temporary peak in the 1996-1998 period. In the early years of 
the new millennium, the relative frequencies of systemically large banks declined, but these 
frequencies reached new highs in the 2006-2007 period, before a slight drop-off in 2008. The  10
percentage of banks with a liabilities-to-GDP ratio exceeding 0.5, for instance, reached a high of 
3.36 in 2006, and declined to 2.71 in 2008.  
 
2.2. Bank  market  valuation,  CDS spreads and other variables 
  In the empirical work below, we relate two variables using market prices to the systemic 
bank size and national public finance variables. Using stock price data, we first construct bank’s 
market-to-book ratio as the market value of the bank’s common equity divided by the book value 
of common equity. The market value of a bank’s common equity is available from Datastream. 
The market-to-book ratio should reflect any costs or benefits of systemic bank size to bank 
shareholders. The market-to-book has a sample mean of 1.45 in the overall sample, as seen in 
Table 4.   
Our second dependent variable is a bank’s CDS spread. We construct a bank’s yearly 
CDS spread as the average of daily CDS spreads, provided that there are at least 100 daily CDS 
spreads. We obtain CDS information from Markit. Typically, several CDS contracts are traded 
for a given major bank differing in the duration of the contract and in the definition of the 
deliverable bank liabilities in case of a specified credit event. Following Jorion and Zhang 
(2007), we consider 5-year CDS contracts as these contracts are the most liquid and constitute 
the majority of the entire CDS market. We further select on CDS contracts for senior unsecured 
debt with a modified restructuring (MR) clause.
5 Contracts can be denominated in dollars, euros 
or another major currency, with the currency of denomination selected in this order in case there 
are contracts in multiple currencies 
The CDS spread provides a market indicator of expected credit losses on bank liabilities, 
as the seller of the CDS contract takes on the obligation to purchase specified bank liabilities at 
par in the event of a bank credit event, as set out in the CDS contract. CDS spreads provide 
direct market estimates of credit losses, as opposed to bond yield spreads that in addition contain 
                                                   
5 This clause is part of the standard ISDA contract since 2001, and it limits deliverable obligations in the event of a 
restructuring agreement to those with a maturity of 30 days or less.  11
a liquidity component (see, for instance, Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005)). CDS spreads 
appear to reflect available information on credit future losses well, as they tend to anticipate debt 
downgrades (see Norden and Weber (2004)), and may reflect insider information (see Acharya 
and Johnson (2007)), and as price discovery takes place primarily in the CDS market (see 
Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005)).
6 Knaup and Wagner (2009) have found that the correlation 
between bank stock returns and an index of corporate CDS spreads provides a good indication of 
bank asset risk exposure during the financial crisis of 2008. 
In practice, we have CDS spreads from 2001 to 2008, with CDS spreads available for a 
total of 59 banks in 2008, as seen in Table 5. In this table, we further see that the mean CDS 
spread per year has been extremely low for most years with a minimum of 0.23 percent in 2004, 
reaching a peak of 1.20 percent in 2008. The mean CDS spread for the entire sample is 0.43 
percent, as seen in Table 4. 
  In the subsequent analysis, we include several additional bank-level and country-level 
variables. Starting with the bank-level variables, assets is the logarithm of total bank assets in 
millions of dollars. This variable measures a bank’s absolute size - rather than its size relative to 
its national economy. Bank size may matter to bank shareholders and liability holders because of 
technological and managerial economies (or diseconomies) of scale. In addition, bank size can 
affect a bank’s expected access to a country’s financial safety net on account of too-big-to-fail 
considerations, independently of the bank’s size relative to the national economy.  
Next, pre-tax profits is the ratio of a bank’s pre-tax profits to assets. Banks that are more 
profitable are expected to have a higher market-to-book ratio. Earning assets, in turn,  is the ratio 
of earning assets to total assets, which proxies for a bank’s business model. Specifically, a bank 
with a high earning assets variable may derive a large share of its income from traditional 
lending activities, rather than from fee-generating activities, such as advisory services, and 
trading on its own account. At a time of depressed values for traditional bank assets such as 
                                                   
6 Recently Hart and Zingales (2009) proposed to use the CDS spread as a trigger device that forces banks to issue 
additional equity if it reaches a certain threshold level.  12
mortgage loans, this variable could negatively affect the market-to-book ratio, while the impact 
on the CDS spread may be positive. An additional bank-level variable is leverage, defined as the 
ratio of total bank liabilities to total assets. The market-to-book ratio may be positively related to 
leverage due to higher implicit subsidies from the financial safety net or alternatively because of 
the deductibility of interest from the corporate tax base, but a negative relationship may also 
exist since higher leverage may increase expected bankruptcy costs. Similarly, the CDS spread 
may be positively related to leverage, if high leverage implies relatively large expected credit 
losses on bank liabilities.  
  A country’s past experience with banking crises may affect the financial support that will 
be available to banks in any future financial crisis. Therefore, we control for the occurrence and 
fiscal cost of past banking crises. Specifically, past crisis is a dummy variable that equals one if a 
country has emerged from a previous banking crisis, and it is zero otherwise. In the table, we see 
that the mean value of this variable is 0.79, which implies that 79 percent of banks are located in 
a country that has suffered a banking crisis. In addition, past fiscal cost represents the ratio of the 
fiscal cost - relative to GDP - of resolving the most recent past banking crisis. This variable is 
zero, if the country has not emerged from any past banking crisis. The information used to 
construct these variables is taken from Laeven and Valencia (2008).   
The table also provides summary statistics on the government debt and fiscal balance 
variables. The fiscal balance is the net fiscal balance, computed as revenues minus expenses and 
depreciation of public capital. The mean government debt and fiscal balance ratios in the sample 
are 49.4 and -2.1 percent, respectively. 
To represent bank risk, we construct the bank stock risk variable as the annualized 
standard deviation of weekly returns on bank stock holdings, based on returns information from 
Datastream. As an alternative index of bank riskiness, we use the Z-score, which is a bank’s 
distance from default, computed as the sum of the bank’s contemporaneous return on assets and 
capital assets ratio, divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets. A higher Z-score 
indicates higher bank stability.    13
Finally, the table provides summary statistics on the indicators of a banks’ systemic size. 
Liabilities is a bank’s liabilities-to-GDP ratio, with a mean of 3.7 percent. Sum of liabilities is 
the ratio of banking-system liabilities to GDP, with a mean of 1.11. Other Liabilities is the 
difference between Sum of Liabilities and an individual bank’s own Liabilities variable, while 
Liabilities sq is the square of Liabilities. The variables Big 0.1, Big 0.25, Big 0.5 and Big 1.0 are 
dummy indicators of systemic size. For instance, Big 0.1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a 
bank’s total liabilities exceed 10 percent of GDP, while it is zero otherwise. Big 0.25, Big 0.5 
and Big 1.0 are defined analogously. In the tables, we see, for instance, that 5.5 percent of banks 
have a liabilities-to-GDP ratio that exceeds 0.1.  
To conclude this section, it is interesting to see how systemically important banks tend to 
differ from smaller banks. To this effect, Table 6 provides the means of our set of variables in 
2008 separately for banks with a liabilities-to-GDP ratio exceeding 0.5 and for smaller banks. 
The table shows that systemically important banks have significantly lower CDS spreads. The 
larger banks further have a higher average earning assets ratio and higher leverage. The larger 
banks in addition tend to be located in countries that experienced fewer banking crises with 
correspondingly lower past fiscal costs of banking crises, while on average they are located in 
countries with lower fiscal balances for the year 2008. 
 
3. The  empirical  evidence 
In this section, we will examine how bank size, in absolute terms and relative to the 
national economy, potentially affects bank valuation and CDS pricing on account of differential 
access to the financial safety net subsidies. We first discuss our tests of whether banks are too big 
too fail and too big to save. Then we present our main empirical results, followed by some 
robustness checks. 
3.1.  Tests of too big to fail and too big to save 
Assets, or the log of bank assets in millions of US dollars, is our measure of absolute 
bank size. This variable can affect a bank’s market-to-book ratio on account of any technological  14
or managerial economies of scale and potentially through a TBTF effect, if the bank is so large 
that a bank failure would create unacceptably high negative externalities to the economy. A 
bank’s TBTF status affects the risk profile of its liabilities, and therefore potentially is priced into 
CDS spreads as well.  
A bank that is large relative to its national economy stands to create large negative 
externalities relative to its economy, if it fails. Thus, systemic size, as proxied by the Liabilities 
variable and the various Big variables, also potentially bestows a bank with TBTF status, leading 
to higher share prices and a lower CDS spread. Conversely, systemic size can make it too 
expensive for a country to bail out a bank, rendering a bank ‘too big to save’ (TBTS). If so, 
systemic size leads to lower bank valuation and higher CDS spreads. Thus the relationships 
between systemic size on the one hand and bank valuation and CDS spreads on the other are a 
priori ambiguous and potentially non-monotonic.  
A country’s ability to bail out its systemically large banks should depend on the health of 
its public finances, as proxied by the central government debt and fiscal balance ratios. The 
government debt and deficit ratios are expected to negatively affect bank valuation, as higher 
government debt signals higher taxes in the future to service the debt and lower capacity to 
support banks through the financial safety net. Bank profitability tends to reflect economic rents 
so that expected future corporate income taxation may well be capitalized into lower share 
prices. A reduced ability on the part of governments to bail out banks affects the risk profile of 
bank liabilities, and hence potentially is priced into higher CDS spreads.   
A restricted government ability to bail out banks on account of distressed public finances 
should especially affect systemically important banks. To test this, we can include an interaction 
variable of, say, the public debt ratio and a categorical indicator of systemic size in our empirical 
specifications. A negative estimated coefficient on such an interaction variable suggests that 
systemically large banks can expect fewer subsidies from the financial safety net in highly 
indebted countries, indicating that they have become ‘too big to save.’ Similarly, such an  15
interaction term may positively affect the CDS spread, signaling larger expected losses on bank 
liabilities for systemically sizeable banks in countries laden with public debt. 
Banks are commonly taken to be subject to moral hazard as increased bank risk 
potentially increases expected benefits from the financial safety net, thereby increasing bank 
valuation. This can explain a positive relationship between bank valuation and an indicator of 
bank risk such as the annualized standard deviation of weekly bank stock return. The relationship 
between bank valuation and bank risk may be even more positive for systemically large banks if 
especially these banks are TBTF, and it can be less positive if there is an offsetting negative 
effect in case these banks are TBTS. To test the relative importance of TBTF and TBTS effects 
for systemic banks, we can include an interaction term of bank risk and an indicator of systemic 
size in the empirical specification. 
Bank risk can be expected to imply larger losses on bank liabilities in the presence of an 
imperfect financial safety net. Thus, bank risk should lead to higher CDS spreads. The 
relationship between the CDS spread and bank risk may be more muted for systemic banks if 
TBTF is relatively more important, while can be more pronounced if TBTS is relatively more 
important. To test this, we can include an interaction variable of bank risk and bank systemic size 
in an empirical specification for estimating the CDS spread. 
 
3.2.  Empirical results on too big to fail versus too big to save 
First, in Table 7, we present results of regressions where the market-to-book ratio and  
the CDS spread are related to bank and banking-system size and bank risk variables and a host of 
control variables. Specifically, Panel A presents regressions where the market-to-book ratio and 
the CDS spread are related only to the bank and banking-system size and risk variables, while 
Panel B presents regressions that in addition include the control variables. The market-to book 
ratio is the dependent variable in regressions 1-5 in either panel, while the CDS spread is the 
dependent variable in regressions 6 through 10. All regressions include country and year fixed 
effects, and errors are clustered at the level of the bank.   16
The market-to-book ratio is seen to be positively and significantly related to the assets 
variable as a measure of absolute bank size in regressions 1-5 in Panel A, while the CDS spread 
does not appear to reflect assets size in regressions 6-10. The positive relationship between bank 
size and bank valuation suggests a TBTF effect for large banks, even if it also may reflect 
economies of scale or management.  
  Next, the public debt variable negatively and significantly affects the market-to-book 
ratio in regressions 1 through 5. Public debt thus is negatively capitalized into bank share prices, 
potentially reflecting that banks cannot be saved as easily in fiscally strapped countries. In the 
CDS regressions 6 through 10, the public debt variable does not obtain a significant coefficient. 
Thus public indebtedness does not appear to affect expected credit losses on bank liabilities, at 
least for senior unsecured bank liabilities.  
Bank risk, proxied by the bank stock risk variable, in turn positively affects the market-
to-book ratio in regressions 1-5 (with significance at 10 percent), as well as the CDS spread in 
regressions 6-10 (with significance at 1 or 5 percent). Bank risk thus benefits bank shareholders, 
presumably because the financial safety net prevents banks’ funding costs from fully reflecting 
bank risk. All the same, increased bank risk implies larger expected losses on bank liabilities, as 
reflected by higher CDS spreads. 
  The bank liabilities-to-GDP ratio enters the market-to-book regression 1 with a negative 
but insignificant coefficient, and it is estimated with a coefficient of zero in the CDS regression 
6. In regressions 2 and 7, we replace the bank-level liabilities-to-GDP ratio by the system-level 
liabilities-to-GDP ratio, yielding insignificant estimated coefficients in both regressions. Next, in 
regressions 3 and 8 the systemic variables are the bank’s own liabilities-to-GDP ratio and the 
ratio of other national banks’ liabilities to GDP, again yielding coefficients that are statistically 
insignificant. Further, regressions 4 and 9 include a bank’s own liabilities-to-GDP ratio and the 
square of this variable. In the market-to-book regression 4, the linear and quadratic liabilities-to-
GDP variables enter with negative and positive coefficients, respectively, that are both 
significant at the 1 percent level.   17
The estimated coefficients of -0.570 and 0.190 on the linear and quadratic liabilities-to-
GDP variables in regression 4 imply that the market-to-book ratio declines with the bank’s 
liabilities-to-GDP ratio if the latter ratio is less than 1.5, while it increases with the liabilities-to-
GDP ratio for higher values of this variable. This suggests that perhaps a very few large banks 
can obtain increased valuation from larger systemic size at the margin, while the vast majority 
can benefit from reduced systemic size. Moreover, the estimated coefficients suggest that all 
banks with a liabilities-to-GDP ratio less than 3.0 (which means all banks in 2008 apart from 
UBS as seen in Table 1) have a lower valuation on account of their systemic size than a 
negligibly small bank with a liabilities-to-GDP ratio of zero.
7 
In the CDS regression 9, the linear and quadratic liabilities-to-GDP terms instead are 
estimated with coefficients that are statistically insignificant. Regressions 5 and 10 jointly 
include the systemic variables included in regressions 3-4 and 8-9 with similar outcomes. Results 
so far suggest that bank valuation increases with absolute bank size, while it declines with 
systemic size for all banks other than a few very large banks. CDS spreads, instead, appear 
unrelated to either absolute or systemic bank size. 
The regressions in Panel B of Table 7 include control variables. The market-to-book ratio 
is seen to be positively and significantly related to pre-tax profits throughout Panel B, while the 
relationship between the CDS spread and pre-tax profits is negative, but not statistically 
significant.  The market-to-book ratio is negatively related to the earning assets variable, 
suggesting that traditional banking activities, involving earning assets, add relatively little value. 
The CDS spread, in turn, is negatively related to the past crisis dummy, and positively related to 
the fiscal cost of past crises in regressions 9 and 10 (both variables are significant at the 10 
percent level). This suggests that CDS spreads positively reflect past crises that have been very 
costly, perhaps because the concerned countries have reformed the financial safety net to make 
                                                   
7 Unless a bank relocates to another country, it cannot change its systemic size without at the same time changing its 
absolute size. Below, we present some illustrative calculations of the impact of a change in bank size on valuation, 
taking into account that systemic size and absolute size vary simultaneously.  18
costly crisis resolution in the future less likely. In some specification, the market-to-book value 
(but not the CDS spreads) is further positively related to per capita GDP (at the 10 percent 
significance level).  
  The relationships between bank valuation on the one hand and the bank size and risk 
variables on the other are not qualitatively affected by the inclusion of controls in Panel B. 
The linear liabilities-to-GDP variables, however, is now estimated with a coefficient of -0.008 
that is significant at 5 percent in the CDS regression 9 of Panel B, while the quadratic liabilities-
to-GDP variable obtains a coefficient of 0.003 that is insignificant in this regression. These point 
estimates suggest that essentially all banks (with liabilities to GDP less than 2.7) can reduce 
expected losses on their liabilities by increasing their systemic size, as evidence of TBTF.  
The results in both panels of Table 7 suggest that the relationships between the market-to-
book ratio and the CDS spread on the one hand and systemic size on the other may be non-linear. 
One way to deal with this is to introduce a categorical variable indicating whether systemic size 
exceeds a certain threshold level. The regressions in Table 8 include the Big0.5 variable, which 
equals one if the liabilities-to-GDP ratio exceeds 0.5 while it is zero otherwise. The table again 
contains two panels, with Panel A including only the bank and banking-system size and risk 
variables, and Panel B in addition including a range of control variables. In regressions 1-5 of 
either panel, the market-to-book value is the dependent variable, while the CDS spread is the 
dependent variable in regressions 6-10. Regressions 5 and 10 in either panel differ from the other 
regressions in that the fiscal balance rather than the public debt ratio is the included public 
finance variable. This leads to a reduced sample size in these regressions, as fiscal balance 
information is available from the IMF and OECD only for recent years for many countries.  
The Big0.5 variable enters the market-to-book regression 1 and the CDS regression 6 
with negative but insignificant coefficients in Panel A of Table 8. In regressions 2 and 6, an 
interaction term of Big0.5 with the public debt ratio is included as well, yielding insignificant 
coefficients in both regressions. Regressions 3 and 7 instead include an interaction term of the 
Big0.5 variable with the bank stock risk variable. Now the Big0.5 variable obtains a negative  19
coefficient of -0.454 that is significant at the 5 percent level in the market-to-book regression, 
while its interaction with bank stock risk obtains a positive coefficient of 0.763 that is significant 
at 10 percent. This suggests that systemically large banks see their valuation increase relatively 
more with higher bank risk at the margin, as bank risk apparently adds to these banks’ TBTF 
status.
8  
In the CDS regression 8 of Panel A of Table 8, the Big0.5 variable is estimated with a 
coefficient of 0.004 that is significant at the 5 percent level, while its interaction with bank stock 
risk obtains a coefficient of -0.013 that is significant at the 1 percent level. These results suggest 
that especially systemically large banks can benefit from taking on more risk, as this reduces the 
expected losses on their bank liabilities on account of strengthening their TBTF status. Again we 
can consider the implications of systemic size for a bank with mean bank stock risk. Such a bank 
will see its CDS spread changed on account of its size by -0.0061 percent (or 0.004 – 
0.013*0.303). The average-risk, systemically large bank thus faces a slightly lower CDS spread, 
on account of increased TBTF status. Regressions 4 and 9 jointly include interaction terms of 
Big0.5 with the public debt and bank stock risk variable, yielding that the Big0.5 variable no 
longer is statistically significant in regression 4. 
  In regressions 5 and 10, as indicated, the fiscal balance variable replaces the government 
debt variable. In regression 5, we see that the market-to-book ratio is positively and significantly 
related to the fiscal balance, confirming that the state of public finances is capitalized into bank 
share prices. The positive coefficient is consistent with the view that countries with sound public 
finances can afford a more generous financial safety net, implying larger implicit subsidies to the 
banking sector. The Big0.5 variable enters this regression with a coefficient of -0.360 that is 
significant at 5 percent, while its interactions with bank risk and the fiscal balance are not 
estimated to be statistically significant. In the CDS regression 10, the fiscal balance is not priced 
                                                   
8 In line with this, we see in Table 6 that systemically large banks have a higher average stock market volatility, 
even if the difference from smaller banks is not statistically significant. In a study of bank risk, Gonzalez (2005) 
finds that regulatory restrictions increase banks’ risk-taking incentives by reducing their charter value.  20
significantly into the CDS spread. Overall, the results of Panel A of Table 8 suggest that 
systemically important banks (with average bank risk) have lower valuation on account of TBTS 
and a slightly lower CDS spread, even if higher risk increase (reduces) bank valuation (CDS 
spreads) of systemically large banks relatively more. 
  The regressions in Panel B of Table 8 are analogous to those reported before but they 
include the set of control variables. Point estimates of coefficients in regressions 3 and 8 
continue to imply that a systemically large bank with average risk has a relatively low valuation 
and a low CDS spread, while additional bank risk increases bank valuation and reduces CDS 
spreads relatively more for systemic banks. Note, however, that the coefficient for the Big0.5 
variable, while negative, is no longer statistically significant in the bank valuation regression 5 
that includes the fiscal balance variable.
9    
The estimation results so far can be used to assess the overall impact of systemic size on 
bank valuation. To do this, we make use of the estimated coefficients in regression 3 of Panel A 
of Table 8. To wit, a systemically large bank (with Big0.5 = 1) with the mean level of bank stock 
risk (i.e., with bank stock risk equal to 0.303 from Table 4) is estimated to obtain a valuation 
discount of 22.3 percent (as -0.454 + 0.763*0.303 = -0.223) on account of its systemic size. Note 
that this estimated discount of 22.3 percent for the share price of a systemically large bank with 
mean bank stock risk closely corresponds to the estimated discount of 22.2 percent on account of 
systemic size in regression 1.  
This suggests that systemically important banks face a strong incentive to downsize or 
split up in order to eliminate the valuation discount. However, a systemically important bank that 
decides to downsize will also reduce its absolute size, thereby reducing the premium it receives 
on account of its absolute size (given that the assets variable is estimated with a positive and 
significant coefficient of 0.073 in regression 3 of Panel A of Table 8). As an example, we can 
                                                   
9 In unreported regressions, we lagged the leverage variable in the specifications of Panel B of Table 8 to reflect that 
shocks to bank valuation or bank liability pricing may affect bank leverage which  yielded qualitatively similar 
results.    21
consider that the average systemically important bank (with mean assets of 26.902 in 2008 in 
Table 6) downsizes to the average systemically unimportant bank (with mean assets of 22.250 in 
2008). This reduces such a bank’s premium on account of large absolute size by 34.0 percent (as 
0.073*(26.902 – 22.250) = 0.340). This would make the overall valuation effect of downsizing, 
accounting for reduced systemic and absolute size, negative at -11.7 percent (as 22.3 – 34.0 = -
11.8).  
These calculations of the impact of downsizing on the valuation of the average bank, 
however, fail to take into account differences in country size. Thus, they do not recognize that a 
systemically important bank located in a small country has to reduce its absolute size relatively 
little to obtain a significant reduction in systemic size. Because of this, systemically large banks 
located in small countries do face incentives to downsize, as this would reduce their discount on 
account of systemic size relatively more, and reduce their premium on account of absolute size 
relatively little. 
The limits imposed by the state of public finances on the financial safety net should be 
particularly important during a time of financial crisis. Therefore, we next consider how the 
market-to-book ratio and the CDS spread depend on the public finance variables in 2007 and 
2008. In particular, regression 1 of Table 9 re-estimates the market-to-book regression 4 of Panel 
B of Table 8 including the public debt variable. This regression is estimated with data only for 
2008, without country fixed effects, and with errors clustered at the country level. Further, 
regression 2 of Table 9 is a market-to-book ratio regression including the public debt variable 
with data for 2007-2008 and including bank-level fixed effects. In regression 1, assets is not 
statistically significant, but in regression 2 it enters with a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient, indicating that at a time of financial crisis an increase in absolute assets size is valued 
negatively. The public debt variable is not significant in regression 1 which omits country or firm 
fixed effects, but it enters with a negative coefficient that is significant at 10 percent in 
regression 2 suggesting that increases in public debt are priced negatively during a financial 
crisis. Bank stock risk enters with a positive and significant coefficient in regression 1, but it  22
obtains a negative and significant coefficient in regression 2. Thus, bank risk is priced positively 
on a cross-section basis in 2008 if we do not control for country or firm fixed effects, but 
additions to risk between 2007 and 2008 are priced negatively while controlling for bank-level 
fixed effects. This suggests a reduced pricing benefit of risk on account of a bank’s contingent 
claim on the financial safety net during a financial crisis.  
  Regression 3 has the CDS spread as the dependent variable and, as regression 2, it is 
estimated with data for 2007 and 2008, and it includes firm-level fixed effects. In this regression, 
the bank stock risk variable obtains a positive and significant coefficient, indicating that 
innovations in bank risk are associated with higher CDS spreads during this period.  
  Regressions 4-6 in Table 9 are similar to regressions 1-3 but they include the fiscal 
balance rather than the public debt as the public finance variable. In regression 4 with 2008 data, 
we see a positive and significant coefficient for the interaction of the Big0.5 variable and the 
fiscal balance. Thus, the market-to-book ratio of systemically large banks is higher in countries 
with a higher fiscal balance which is evidence of a TBTS effect. In the market-to-book ratio and 
CDS regressions 5 and 6 including bank fixed effects, we see a positive and negative coefficient 
for the fiscal balance variable, respectively, indicating that an improvement of the fiscal balance 
between 2007 and 2008 is priced positively and negatively into bank share prices and CDS 
spreads, respectively. Especially the negative pricing of the fiscal balance into the CDS spread 
suggests a TBTS effect, as there is no apparent alternative explanation for this relationship (for 
instance, through the implication of the current fiscal balance on future corporate income 
taxation). 
 
3.3. Robustness  checks 
In the empirical work so far, we have set the threshold level for the liabilities-to-GDP 
ratio used to define the Big variable somewhat arbitrarily equal to 0.5. Alternatively, Table 10 
presents regressions analogous to the market-to-book and CDS regressions 3 and 8 of Panel B of 
Table 8 where we choose different thresholds to define the Big variable. Specifically, columns 1  23
and 5 of Table 10 present regressions of the market-to-book ratio and the CDS spread where the 
threshold value for the liabilities-to-GDP ratio in the definition of Big is 0.1, while in regressions 
2 and 6 the threshold is 0.25 and in regressions 4 and 8 it is 1.0. For comparison, columns 3 and 
7 copy regressions 4 and 9 of Panel B of Table 8. Looking across columns 1-4, we see that the 
Big variable obtains a significant negative coefficient, and its interaction with bank risk a 
significant negative coefficient, for thresholds in the definition of Big equal to 0.25 and 0.5. 
Apparently, the additional contribution of risk to bank valuation for large banks is only material 
for reasonably high thresholds for the liabilities-to-GDP ratio in the definition of Big. The Big 
variable and its interaction with bank stock risk fail to be estimated with a significant coefficient 
for a threshold level of 1.0, because either there are off-setting TBTF and TBTS effects or there 
are simply too few banks with liabilities exceeding GDP to estimate the coefficient for this 
interaction variable with precision.  
The CDS spread is the dependent variable in regressions 5 to 8 of Table 10 for varying 
thresholds in the definition of the Big variable. The Big variable obtains a significant positive 
coefficient, and its interaction with bank risk obtains a significant negative coefficient, for all 
four thresholds in the definition of Big. This suggests a strong TBTF effect relative to the TBTS 
effect for systemically large banks for varying definitions of systemic size. The estimated 
coefficients in regressions 5-8 monotonically increase from -0.021 with a threshold for Big of 
0.10 in regression 5 to -0.012 with a threshold for Big of 1.0 in regression 8. This implies that the 
very largest banks see their CDS spreads decline less with additional risk than banks that are 
somewhat smaller. 
Table 11 represents several additional robustness checks. First, we recognize that a 
country’s ability of bail out its biggest banks may depend on its public debt relative to its 
borrowing capacity rather than simply on its actual public debt ratio. To deal with this, we 
construct a country’s public indebtedness relative to its borrowing capacity as the residual from a 
regression of the pubic debt ratio on per capita GDP, as richer countries can and in fact tend to 
borrow more. Then we re-estimate the market-to-book and CDS regressions 3 and 8 of Panel B  24
of Table 8 after replacing the public debt ratio by this residual public debt ratio, and present the 
results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 11. The residual public debt variable is seen to be negatively 
and significantly reflected in bank valuation, while the Big0.5 variable now obtains a coefficient 
of -0.380 that is significant at the 5 percent level. 
Next, it can be the case that the public debt is endogenous to the state of the banking 
system, as declines of bank share prices and increases in CDS spreads may prompt a bank bail-
out, which can raise public indebtedness. To deal with this, we replace the public debt ratio by its 
lagged value in regressions 3 and 8 of Panel B of Table 8, with the results in columns 3 and 4 in 
Table 11. The lagged public debt ratio is now estimated with a negative and significant 
coefficient in the market-to-book regression in column 3, confirming a capitalization of the 
public debt into lower bank share pricing consistent with a TBTS effect. Finally, in columns 5 
and 6 of the table we replace the stock market variability variable by the bank’s Z-score in the 
benchmark market-to-book and CDS specifications. This measure of bank risk derived from 
accounting information is negatively related the market-to-book ratio and the CDS spread 
(consistent with the positive relationships between bank stock risk and these two variables), but 
these relationships are not statistically significant. 
 
4. Conclusion 
  Empirical evidence on economies of scale in banking, such as in Berger and Mester 
(1997), suggests that many banks grow beyond the size that minimizes average costs. One reason 
for this may be that size benefits managers who see their compensation increase with bank size, 
possibly at the expense of shareholders. Alternatively, banks increase their size beyond the 
economically efficient point in order to become ‘too big to fail,’ which reduces their costs of 
funding.  A bail-out of a systemically large bank, i.e. a bank that is large relative to the economy, 
would put considerable strain on a country’s public finances. This raises doubts about a 
country’s ability and determination to bail out its systemically large banks. Systemic size thus 
reduces a bank’s contingent claim on the financial safety net. Our estimation suggests that the  25
average systemically large bank’s share price is discounted 22.3 percent on account of its 
systemic size, based on estimation for a large international sample of banks over the 1991-2008 
period. 
  Especially at a time of financial and economic crisis, there are doubts about countries’ 
ability to keep their largest banks afloat. For 2008, we present evidence that the share prices of 
systemically large banks were discounted relatively more on account of systemic size in 
countries running large fiscal deficits. This is evidence that systemic banks located in countries 
with stressed public finances saw their contingent claim on the financial safety net reduced 
relatively more in 2008, which is evidence that they have grown ‘too big to save’. 
  The problem of ‘too big to save’ facing systemically large banks in fiscally strapped 
countries is likely to change the structure of the international banking system in the years to 
come. Banks in all banking systems will face pressure to deleverage in order to reduce risks for 
themselves and for the financial safety net. However, especially systemically large banks in 
fiscally constrained countries have incentives to downsize in order to be able to rely on the 
financial safety net in the future. Our evidence suggests that this should increase bank valuation. 
Indeed, in 2008 we see that very large banks are deleveraging also relative to their economy’s 
size. The downsizing that occurred in 2008 may thus in part be driven by a desire to increase 
stock market valuation in the face of ‘too big to save’ effect, even if downsizing no doubt has 
also been forced by reduced capital on account of losses and difficulties to raise equity as well as 
other capital at a time of financial crisis.  
  There is an obvious policy interest in reducing bank size at least below the point where 
banks’ national contingent liabilities are so large that there are doubts about countries’ abilities to 
stabilize their banking system. In Europe, in 2009 downsizing of some of the largest banks that 
have received public assistance during the financial crisis, such as Lloyds and Royal Bank of 
Scotland in the UK, Commerzbank in Germany and ING in the Netherlands, has been imposed 
by the European Commission that has ruled that public assistance has disturbed bank 
competition. Thus, although the Commission’s motivation has been to prevent a future  26
occurrence of public assistance that would bring unfair competitive advantages to the recipients, 
the effect will be to reduce the size of some of Europe’s largest banks.  
In the US the Obama administration has suggested regulation which would limit any 
bank’s share of national bank liabilities to 10 percent, and in addition it has proposed taxing non-
deposit bank liabilities at a rate of 0.15 cent per dollar per year for banks with assets in excess of 
$50 billion. In 2008, Switzerland already adopted a regime of higher capital requirements for its 
largest banks, i.e. UBS and Credit Suisse, which provides an incentive to these banks to 
downsize. Policy steps to downsize very large banks that have not received assistance during the 
financial crisis have so far not been undertaken in the EU, even though politicians in countries  
such as the UK and the Netherlands have at times voiced their desire to reduce their countries’ 
contingent liabilities on account of large banks and large banking systems. Recently, Germany 
and the UK have shown themselves supportive of opening discussion in the G20 on international 
coordination on additional taxation on banks that could easily be slanted towards large-size 
banks, limiting the ‘too big to fail’ and ‘too big to save’ phenomena. In April 2010, the IMF 
completed a report advocating additional taxation of banks which will be a reference point in this 
debate. 
  Even in the absence of additional regulation and taxation, the percentage of banks that is 
systemically large already declined in 2008 relative to the two previous years. Our paper shows 
that this trend may reflect private incentives to downsize in the face of a too-big-to-save effect in 
fiscally constrained countries. Additional regulation or taxation aimed at very large banks could 
serve to strengthen this trend.  27
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Appendix. Variable definitions and data sources 
 
Variable Description  Sources 
    
Market-to-book   Market value of common equity divided by book value of common 
equity 
Bankscope and Datastream 
CDS  Annual average of daily credit default spreads for 5-year contracts  Markit 
Public debt  Central government debt divided by GDP  IMF and OECD 
Residual public debt  Residual of regression of public debt on GDP per capita  IMF, OECD and WDI 
Fiscal balance 
Ratio of central government revenues minus expenses and minus 
depreciation of public capital to GDP 
IMF 
Liabilities  Bank liabilities divided by GDP  Bankscope and WDI 
Sum liabilities  Sum of bank liabilities in a country divided by GDP  Bankscope and WDI 
Other liabilities  Sum of the liabilities of other banks in a country divided by GDP  Bankscope and WDI 
Liabilities sq  Square of ratio of bank liabilities to GDP  Bankscope and WDI 
Big0.1 
Dummy variable that equals one if ratio of bank liabilities to GDP 
exceeds 0.1 and zero otherwise 
Bankscope and WDI 
Big0.25 
Dummy variable that equals one if ratio of bank liabilities to GDP 
exceeds 0.25 and zero otherwise 
Bankscope and WDI 
Big0.5 
Dummy variable that equals one if ratio of bank liabilities to GDP 
exceeds 0.5 and zero otherwise 
Bankscope and WDI 
Big1.0 
Dummy variable that equals one if ratio of bank liabilities to GDP 
exceeds 1.0 and zero otherwise 
Bankscope and WDI 




Index of bank solvency constructed as
SROA
CAR ROA
, where ROA is 
return on assets, CAR represents capital assets ratio and SROA stands 
for standard deviation of return on assets 
Bankscope 
Assets  Log of assets in millions of US dollars  Bankscope 
Pre-tax profits  Pre-tax profits divided by assets  Bankscope 
Earning assets  Earning assets divided by assets  Bankscope 
Leverage  Liabilities divided by assets  Bankscope 
GDP per capita  GDP per capita in thousands of 2000 constant US dollars  WDI 
Past crisis  Dummy variable that is one if country is not currently experiencing a 
banking crisis but has experienced a banking crisis before and zero 
Laeven and Valencia (2008)  30
otherwise 
Past fiscal cost  Fiscal cost of resolving most recent but not current banking crisis 
divided by GDP 
Laeven and Valencia (2008) 
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Table 1. Systemically large banks in 2008 
 
This table lists banks with a liabilities-to-GDP ratio exceeding 0.5. Liabilities is the liabilities-to-GDP ratio. Absolute liabilities is the amount of bank liabilities in billions of 
US dollars. 
Bank Name  Country Liabilities  Absolute  liabilities  (US$B) 
UBS AG  Switzerland 3.723  1,852 
ING Groep NV  Netherlands 2.218  1,813 
Credit Suisse Group  Switzerland 2.126  1,058 
Danske Bank A/S  Denmark 1.972  652 
Dexia  Belgium 1.904  900 
HSBC Holdings Plc  United Kingdom  1.707  2,437 
Barclays Plc  United Kingdom  1.412  2,939 
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The)  United Kingdom  1.282  2,669 
BNP Paribas  France 1.042  2,824 
KBC Group-KBC Groep NV/ KBC Groupe SA  Belgium  1.011  478 
Bank of Ireland  Ireland 0.991  302 
DBS Group Holdings Ltd  Singapore 0.919  164 
Banco Santander SA  Spain 0.910  1,387 
Allied Irish Banks plc  Ireland 0.896  240 
Deutsche Bank AG  Germany 0.870  3,021 
Crédit Agricole S.A.  France 0.825  2,235 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB  Sweden  0.767  311 
DnB Nor ASA  Norway 0.690  250 
Erste Group Bank AG  Austria 0.670  265 
Svenska Handelsbanken  Sweden 0.659  267 
United Overseas Bank Limited UOB  Singapore  0.658  118 
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited OCBC  Singapore  0.648  116 
BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd  Hong Kong  0.634  137 
UniCredit SpA  Italy 0.631  1,374 
Standard Bank Group Limited  South Africa  0.617  151 
Société Générale  France 0.563  1,526  32
National Australia Bank  Australia 0.555  503 
Swedbank AB  Sweden 0.549  222 
Millennium bcp-Banco Comercial Português, SA  Portugal  0.538  124 













Table 2. Top 20 Countries with the largest system-wide liabilities-to-GDP ratio in 2008 
 
This table contains the list of top 20 countries with the largest sum of bank liabilities to GDP ratio, denoted Sum liabilities. 
Country  Sum liabilities 
Switzerland  6.293 
United Kingdom  5.498 
Belgium  2.916 
France  2.737 
Netherlands  2.469 
Ireland  2.393 
Denmark  2.330 
Singapore  2.266 
Australia  2.132 
Sweden  1.982 
Canada  1.799 
Spain  1.749 
Japan  1.657 
South Africa  1.625 
Greece  1.482 
Italy  1.432 
Israel  1.377 
Germany  1.350 
Hong Kong  1.301 




Table 3.  Systemically large banks and public finances in 2008 
 
This table presents information on the size and number of large banks and the public finances for individual countries. Sum liabilities is the sum of bank liabilities in a country 
divided by GDP. Max of Liabilities is the maximum of any bank’s liabilities divided by GDP. No. of banks with Liabilities ≥ 0.1 is number of banks with a liabilities-to-GDP 
ratio exceeding 0.1. Public debt is central government debt divided by GDP. Fiscal balance is the ratio of central government revenues minus expenses and minus depreciation 
of public capital to GDP.  
Country  Sum  liabilities Max  of  Liabilities No.  of  Banks No. of banks 
 with Liabilities ≥ 0.1 
No. of banks 
 with Liabilities ≥ 0.25 
No. of banks 
 with Liabilities ≥ 0.5 
No. of banks 
 with Liabilities ≥ 1.0  Public debt  Fiscal balance 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8)  (9) 
Australia  2.132  0.555  12  6 4  1 0 0.051  0.026 
Austria  1.251  0.670  7  3 2  1 0 0.595  -0.006 
Belgium  2.916  1.904  3  2 2  2 2 0.902  -0.013 
Brazil  0.865  0.203  20  5 0  0 0    
Canada  1.799  0.465  13  5 4  0 0 0.286  0.007 
Chile  0.759  0.221  6  3 0  0 0    
Czech  Republic  0.172  0.172  1  1 0  0 0 0.270  -0.022 
Denmark  2.330  1.972  15  2 1  1 1 0.323  0.035 
Finland  0.181  0.166  4  1 0  0 0 0.292  0.047 
France  2.737  1.042  9  4 4  3 1 0.542  -0.027 
Germany  1.350  0.870  13  2 1  1 0 0.389   
Greece  1.482  0.390  11  5 3  0 0 1.079  -0.065 
Hungary  0.337  0.313  2  1 1  0 0 0.684  -0.043 
Ireland  2.393  0.991  3  3 3  3 0 0.271  -0.027 
Israel  1.377  0.408  6  5 2  0 0   -0.016 
Italy  1.432  0.631  16  3 2  1 0 0.977  -0.024 
Korea  0.548  0.271  4  2 1  0 0 0.291   
Lithuania  0.235  0.117  4  1 0  0 0   -0.005 
Luxembourg  0.023  0.023  1  0 0  0 0 0.088  0.047 
Mexico  0.059  0.044  2  0 0  0 0 0.245   
Morocco  0.184  0.131  2  1 0  0 0   0.064 
Netherlands  2.469  2.218  4  2 1  1 1 0.502  0.014 
Norway  0.866  0.690  10  1 1  1 0 0.138  0.194  35
Poland  0.446  0.095  10  0 0  0 0 0.450  -0.009 
Portugal  1.217  0.538  3  3 2  1 0 0.713  -0.035 
Romania  0.089  0.089  1  0 0  0 0   -0.016 
Slovakia  0.177  0.154  2  1 0  0 0 0.262  -0.001 
Slovenia  0.137  0.137  1  1 0  0 0   0.011 
Spain  1.749  0.910  9  3 2  1 0 0.335  -0.018 
Sweden  1.982  0.767  5  3 3  3 0 0.360  0.032 
Switzerland  6.293  3.723  15  2 2  2 2 0.229   
Turkey  0.533  0.101  14  1 0  0 0 0.400   
United  Kingdom  5.498  1.707  25  6 6  3 3 0.607  -0.036 
USA  0.939  0.144  464  3 0  0 0 0.404  -0.055 







Table 4. Summary statistics on bank and country variables 
 
This table presents summary statistics of variables. Market-to-book is market value of common equity divided by book value of common equity. CDS is annual average of 
daily credit default spreads for 5-year contracts. Assets is natural logarithm of total assets in constant 2000 US dollars. Pre-tax profits is pre-tax profits divided by total assets. 
Earning assets is earning assets divided by total assets. Leverage is liabilities divided by total assets.  GDP per capita is GDP per capita in constant 2000 dollars. Past crisis is 
dummy variable that is one if country is not currently experiencing a banking crisis but has experienced a banking crisis before and zero otherwise. Past fiscal cost is fiscal 
cost of resolving most recent but not current banking crisis divided by GDP. Public debt is central government debt divided by GDP. Fiscal balance is ratio of central 
government revenues minus expenses and minus depreciation of capital to GDP. Bank stock risk is annualized standard deviation of weekly dividend-inclusive bank stock 
returns. Z-score is Index of bank solvency constructed as
SROA
CAR ROA
 where ROA is return on assets, CAR represents capital assets ratio and SROA stands for standard 
deviation of return on assets. Liabilities is bank liabilities divided by GDP. Sum liabilities is sum of bank liabilities in a country divided by GDP. Other liabilities is sum of the 
liabilities of other banks in a country divided by GDP. Liabilities sq is square of ratio of bank liabilities to GDP. Big 0.1, Big 0.25 and Big 1 are dummy variables. They are 
equal to 1 if Liabilities-to-GDP ratio is greater than or equal to 0.1, 0.25, and 1 respectively, and they otherwise equal 0.  
Variable Observations  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Market-to-book  10,961  1.449 0.768 0.000 4.983 
CDS  249  0.004323 0.006639 0.000552 0.056026 
Assets  10,981  21.685 2.122  14.947 28.550 
Pre-tax  profits  10,966  0.013 0.032 -0.893  0.416 
Earning  assets  10,971  0.901 0.100 0.000 0.999 
Leverage  10,981  0.894 0.107 0.005 1 
GDP per capita  10,980  32.724  7.704  1.693  56.189 
Past  crisis  10,982  0.790 0.407 0  1 
Past  fiscal  cost  10,982  0.043 0.053 0  0.32 
Public  debt  10,841  0.494 0.334 0.008 1.638 
Fiscal  balance  4,751  -0.021 0.034  -0.168 0.194 
Bank  stock  risk  10,975  0.303 0.197 0.000 3.795 
Z-score  10,391  26.836 23.118 0.247  146.529 
Liabilities  10,982  0.037 0.217 0.000 4.725 
Sum  of  liabilities  10,982  1.112 0.905 0.000 8.319 
Other  liabilities  10,982  1.075 0.849 0.000 7.661 
Liabilities  sq  10,982  0.049 0.587 0.000 22.323 
Big  0.1  10,982  0.055 0.228 0  1  37
Big  0.25  10,982  0.029 0.167 0  1 
Big  0.5  10,982  0.017 0.128 0  1 













Table 5. Summary statistics for CDS 5-year spreads by year 
 
This table contains  summary statistics for CDS 5-year spreads by year between 2001 and 2008 
Year N  Mean  Std.  dev.  Min  Max 
2001  2  0.003469 0.000019 0.003456 0.003482 
2002  8  0.005399 0.002402 0.003021 0.009548 
2003  13  0.004239 0.003052 0.001686 0.010744 
2004  34  0.002278 0.001235 0.000786 0.006375 
2005  47  0.002859 0.005682 0.000795 0.02927 
2006  57  0.002317 0.006094 0.000552 0.046864 
2007  78  0.004061 0.006721 0.001132 0.056026 








Table 6. Means of variables for systemically large and small banks in 2008 
 
This table lists the means of variables for all banks, and separately for banks with a liabilities-to-GDP ratio less than 0.5 and with a liabilities-to-GDP ratio equal to or more 
than 0.5. The last column contains the t-statistics of mean comparison tests for systemically large and small banks. Market-to-book is market value of common equity divided 
by book value of common equity. CDS is annual average of daily credit default spreads for 5-year contracts. Assets is natural logarithm of total assets in constant 2000 US 
dollars. Pre-tax profits is pre-tax profits divided by total assets. Earning assets is earning assets divided by total assets. Leverage is liabilities divided by total assets.  GDP per 
capita is GDP per capita in constant 2000 dollars. Past crisis is dummy variable that is one if country is not currently experiencing a banking crisis but has experienced a 
banking crisis before and zero otherwise. Past fiscal cost is fiscal cost of resolving most recent but not current banking crisis divided by GDP. Public debt is central 
government debt divided by GDP. Fiscal balance is ratio of central government revenues minus expenses and minus depreciation of capital to GDP. Bank stock risk is 
annualized standard deviation of weekly dividend-inclusive bank stock returns. Z-score is index of bank solvency constructed as
SROA
CAR ROA
 where ROA is return on 
assets, CAR represents capital assets ratio and SROA stands for standard deviation of return on assets. Liabilities is bank liabilities divided by GDP. Sum liabilities is sum of 
bank liabilities in a country divided by GDP. Other liabilities is sum of the liabilities of other banks in a country divided by GDP. Liabilities sq is square of ratio of bank 
liabilities to GDP. Big 0.1, Big 0.25 and Big 1 are dummy variables. They are equal to 1 if liabilities-to-GDP ratio is greater than or equal to 0.1, 0.25, and 1 respectively, and 
they otherwise equal 0.   
Variables  Total  Liabilities < 0.5  Liabilities ≥ 0.5  Mean comparison test 
 Observations  Mean  Observations  Mean Observations Mean t-Statistics 
Market-to-book  1,045  1.532 1,015  1.526 30  1.736 -1.538 
CDS  59  0.012005 46  0.012932 13  0.008726 3.298 
Assets  1,047  22.383 1,017  22.250 30  26.902 -21.327 
Pre-tax  profits  1,047  0.006 1,017  0.006 30  0.003 1.586 
Earning  assets  1,047  0.892 1,017  0.891 30  0.928 -4.359 
Leverage  1,047  0.890 1,017  0.888 30  0.959 -13.220 
GDP per capita  988  29.423  958  29.485  30  27.418  1.410 
Past  crisis  1,047  0.787 1,017  0.802 30  0.267 6.449 
Past fiscal  cost  1,047  0.047  1,017  0.049  30  0.006  10.052 
Public  debt  677  0.422 652  0.420 25  0.465 -0.919 
Fiscal balance  643  -0.039  621  -0.040  22  0.000  -3.651 
Bank  stock  risk  1,047  0.555 1,017  0.553 30  0.616 -1.484 
Z-score  973  23.931 945  23.953 28  23.214 0.197 
Liabilities  988  0.061 958  0.029 30  1.083 -8.125 
Sum of  liabilities  1,047  1.206  1,017  1.162  30  2.692  -5.460 
Other  liabilities  988  1.217 958  1.204 30  1.609 -1.922  40
Liabilities  sq  988  0.056 958  0.006 30  1.661 -3.401 
Big 0.1  1,047  0.109  1,017  0.083  30  1  -110 
Big 0.25  1,047  0.059  1,017  0.031  30  1  -180 










Table 7. Determinants of the market-to-book ratio and the CDS spread 
 
The dependent variable is the market-to-book ratio in columns 1 to 5 and the CDS spread in columns 6 to 10 in both Panel A and Panel B.  Market-to-book is the market value 
of common equity divided by the book value of common equity. CDS is the annual average of daily credit default spreads on a 5-year contract. Assets is natural logarithm of 
total assets in constant 2000 US dollars. Pre-tax profits is pre-tax profits divided by total assets. Earning assets is earning assets divided by total assets. Leverage is liabilities 
divided by total assets.  GDP per capita is GDP per capita in constant 2000 dollars. Past crisis is dummy variable that is one if country is not currently experiencing a banking 
crisis but has experienced a banking crisis before and zero otherwise. Past fiscal cost is fiscal cost of resolving most recent but not current banking crisis divided by GDP. 
Public debt is central government debt divided by GDP. Bank stock risk is annualized standard deviation of weekly dividend-inclusive bank stock returns. Liabilities is bank 
liabilities divided by GDP. Sum liabilities is sum of bank liabilities in a country divided by GDP. Other liabilities is sum of the liabilities of other banks in a country divided 
by GDP. Liabilities sq is square of ratio of bank liabilities to GDP. All regressions are estimated with year and country fixed effects and clustering at the bank level. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Basic regressions 
  Market-to-Book Market-to-Book Market-to-Book Market-to-Book Market-to-Book CDS  CDS  CDS  CDS  CDS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Assets  0.071***  0.069***  0.070***  0.078***  0.078***  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public  debt  -0.770*** -0.763*** -0.764*** -0.786*** -0.781*** -0.018 -0.019 -0.019 -0.017 -0.017 
  (0.105)  (0.105)  (0.105)  (0.105)  (0.105)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Bank  stock  risk  0.127*  0.125*  0.126*  0.128*  0.128*  0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029** 
  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Liabilities  -0.035   -0.021 -0.570***  -0.555***  0.000    0.000  -0.004  -0.004 
  (0.130)   (0.133) (0.171) (0.172) (0.002)    (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Sum  liabilities   0.020       0.000       
   (0.027)       (0.001)       
Other  liabilities    0.023   0.021      0.000    0.000 
    (0.027)   (0.027)      (0.001)    (0.001) 
Liabilities  sq        0.190***  0.189***     0.002  0.002 
        (0.044)  (0.044)     (0.002)  (0.002) 
N  10,815  10,815  10,815  10,815 10,815  249 249 249 249 249 
R-sq  0.184 0.184 0.184 0.187 0.187 0.587  0.587  0.587  0.589  0.589 
Country  fixed  effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  fixed  effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering  level  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank  42
Panel B: Regressions with additional control variables 
  Market-to-book Market-to-book Market-to-book Market-to-book Market-to-book CDS  CDS  CDS  CDS  CDS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Assets  0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.077*** 0.076*** -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pre-tax  profits  3.298*** 3.293*** 3.290*** 3.270*** 3.263*** -0.182  -0.171  -0.182  -0.185  -0.185 
  (0.896) (0.897) (0.897) (0.898) (0.899) (0.140)  (0.142)  (0.140)  (0.138)  (0.138) 
Earning    assets  -0.517*** -0.514*** -0.514*** -0.498**  -0.495**  -0.010  -0.010  -0.010  -0.010  -0.010 
  (0.195) (0.194) (0.194) (0.194) (0.194) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Leverage  0.167 0.167 0.169 0.176 0.178 0.008  0.004  0.008  0.005  0.005 
  (0.229) (0.228) (0.229) (0.232) (0.232) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) 
GDP per capita  0.039  0.044*  0.044*  0.041*  0.046*  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Past  crisis  0.004 -0.011  -0.011  0.005 -0.009  -0.008*  -0.008*  -0.008*  -0.008*  -0.008* 
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Past  fiscal  cost  -0.083 0.028  0.030  -0.078 0.035  0.223  0.220  0.223  0.232*  0.237* 
  (0.570) (0.576) (0.577) (0.568) (0.576) (0.138) (0.139) (0.140) (0.139) (0.142) 
Public  debt  -0.707*** -0.690*** -0.690*** -0.721*** -0.704*** 0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.003  0.004 
  (0.109) (0.110) (0.110) (0.109) (0.110) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Bank  stock  risk  0.124* 0.122* 0.122* 0.126* 0.125* 0.025***  0.025***  0.025***  0.025***  0.025*** 
  (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Liabilities -0.004    0.013  -0.463***  -0.445*** -0.002    -0.002  -0.008**  -0.009* 
  (0.118)   (0.122) (0.161) (0.163) (0.002)    (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Sum  liabilities   0.027       -0.000       
   (0.028)       (0.001)       
Other  liabilities      0.028    0.028    -0.000   -0.000 
      (0.027)    (0.027)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
Liabilities  sq        0.162*** 0.162***       0.003  0.004 
        (0.041) (0.041)    (0.002)  (0.002) 
N  10,791 10,791 10,791 10,791 10,791 248  248  248  248  248 
R-sq  0.208 0.208 0.208 0.210 0.210 0.642  0.640  0.642  0.647  0.648 
Country  fixed  effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustering  level  Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank 
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Table 8. The impact of systemic bank size defined by a liabilities-to-GDP ratio exceeding 0.5 
 
The dependent variable is the market-to-book ratio in columns 1 to 5 and the CDS spread in columns 6 to 10 in both Panel A and Panel B. Market-to-book is the market value 
of common equity divided by the book value of common equity. CDS is the annual average of daily credit default spreads on a 5-year contract. Assets is natural logarithm of 
total assets in constant 2000 US dollars. Pre-tax profits is pre-tax profits divided by total assets. Earning assets is earning assets divided by total assets. Leverage is liabilities 
divided by total assets.  GDP per capita is GDP per capita in constant 2000 dollars. Past crisis is dummy variable that is one if country is not currently experiencing a banking 
crisis but has experienced a banking crisis before and zero otherwise. Past fiscal cost is fiscal cost of resolving most recent but not current banking crisis divided by GDP. 
Public debt is central government debt divided by GDP. Fiscal balance is ratio of central government revenues minus expenses and minus depreciation of capital to GDP. 
Bank stock risk is annualized standard deviation of weekly dividend-inclusive bank stock returns. Big0.5 is a dummy variable that equals one if ratio of bank liabilities to GDP 
exceeds 0.5 and zero otherwise. All regressions are estimated with year and country fixed effects and clustering at the bank level. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Basic regressions 
    Market-to-book Market-to-book Market-to-book Market-to-book Market-to-book CDS  CDS  CDS  CDS  CDS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Assets  0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.044*** -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Public  debt  -0.773*** -0.770*** -0.775*** -0.772***   -0.018  -0.019  -0.020*  -0.021*   
  (0.105) (0.106) (0.105) (0.106)   (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)   
Fiscal  balance      7.096***          0.023 
      (1.359)          (0.054) 
Bank  stock  risk  0.129* 0.129* 0.122* 0.122* 0.274***  0.029***  0.029***  0.030***  0.030***  0.031** 
  (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.084) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
Big0.5  -0.222 -0.031 -0.454**  -0.256 -0.360**  -0.000  -0.000  0.004**  0.003*  0.004* 
  (0.146) (0.310) (0.193) (0.340) (0.158) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Big0.5  *  Public  debt   -0.449   -0.475     0.000    0.002   
   (0.564)   (0.559)     (0.003)    (0.002)   
Big0.5 * Bank stock risk      0.763*  0.778*  0.316      -0.013***  -0.013***  -0.011** 
      (0.414) (0.409) (0.353)   (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Big0.5 * Fiscal balance          -1.436          -0.007 
      (2.591)          (0.015) 
N  10,815 10,815 10,815 10,815 4,746  249  249  249  249  192 
R-sq  0.185 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.263 0.587  0.587  0.601  0.602  0.644 
Country  Fixed  Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Fixed  Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustering  Level  Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank 
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Panel B: Regressions with additional control variables 
  Market-to-book Market-to-book Market-to-book Market-to-book Market-to-book CDS  CDS  CDS  CDS  CDS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Assets  0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.030*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Pre-tax  profits  3.284*** 3.288*** 3.271*** 3.275*** 4.836*** -0.174 -0.175 -0.132 -0.133 -0.233 
  (0.896) (0.898) (0.896) (0.897) (1.328) (0.141)  (0.141)  (0.135)  (0.135)  (0.153) 
Earning  assets  -0.515*** -0.516*** -0.516*** -0.517*** -0.661*** -0.011  -0.011  -0.015  -0.016  0.005 
  (0.194) (0.195) (0.194) (0.195) (0.212) (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.011) 
Leverage  0.174 0.181 0.173 0.180 1.065***  0.006  0.006  0.009  0.009  -0.009 
  (0.230) (0.231) (0.230) (0.231) (0.195) (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.028) 
GDP  per  capita  0.040 0.038 0.039 0.037 0.029 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.059) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Past  crisis  0.008 0.007 0.011 0.010 -0.353***  -0.008*  -0.008*  -0.010**  -0.010**  -0.008* 
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.079) (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Past  fiscal  cost  -0.085 -0.103 -0.147 -0.167 14.287***  0.223  0.223  0.294*  0.296*  0.267* 
  (0.570) (0.573) (0.575) (0.578) (2.345) (0.138)  (0.138)  (0.152)  (0.153)  (0.137) 
Public  debt  -0.713*** -0.712*** -0.713*** -0.711***   0.000  -0.001  0.002  0.001   
  (0.109)  (0.109)  (0.109)  (0.109)    (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)  
Fiscal  balance      4.096***          -0.028 
      (1.487)          (0.033) 
Bank  stock  risk 0.126* 0.127* 0.120* 0.120* 0.390***  0.025***  0.025***  0.029***  0.030***  0.025*** 
  (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.099) (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Big0.5  -0.174 -0.012 -0.380**  -0.211 -0.202 -0.001  -0.002  0.004**  0.003  0.004** 
  (0.138) (0.299) (0.186) (0.329) (0.154) (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Big0.5  *  Public  debt   -0.381   -0.407     0.001    0.004   
   (0.551)   (0.546)     (0.003)    (0.003)   
Big0.5 * Bank stock risk      0.678*  0.692*  -0.242      -0.018**  -0.018**  -0.014*** 
      (0.405) (0.401) (0.335)     (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005) 
Big0.5  *  Fiscal  balance      -0.256          -0.014 
      (2.263)          (0.019) 
N  10,791 10,791 10,791 10,791 4,729  248 248 248 248 191 
R-sq  0.208 0.208 0.209 0.209 0.306 0.641  0.641  0.664  0.665  0.739 
Country  Fixed  Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Fixed  Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustering  Level Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank  45
Table 9. Determinants of the market-to-book ratio and the cds spreads during 2007-2008 
 
Dependent variable is market-to-book ratio in regressions 1-2 and 4-5 and the CDS spread in regressions 3 and 6. Market-to-book is market value of common equity divided 
by book value of common equity. CDS is annual average of daily credit default spreads for 5-year contracts. Assets is natural logarithm of total assets in constant 2000 US 
dollars. Pre-tax profits is pre-tax profits divided by total assets. Earning assets is earning assets divided by total assets. Leverage is liabilities divided by total assets. GDP per 
capita is GDP per capita in constant 2000 dollars. Past crisis is dummy variable that is one if country is not currently experiencing a banking crisis but has experienced a 
banking crisis before and zero otherwise. Past fiscal cost is fiscal cost of resolving most recent but not current banking crisis divided by GDP. Public debt is central 
government debt divided by GDP. Fiscal balance is ratio of central government revenues minus expenses and minus depreciation of capital to GDP. Bank stock risk is 
annualized standard deviation of weekly dividend-inclusive bank stock returns. Big0.5 is a dummy variable that equals one if ratio of bank liabilities to GDP exceeds 0.5 and it 
is zero otherwise. Big0.5, 2007 is a dummy variable that equals one if ratio of bank liabilities to GDP exceeds 0.5 in 2007 and it is zero otherwise. Regressions 1 and 4 are 
estimated with clustering at the country level. Regressions 2-3 and 4-5 contain bank fixed effects. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
  Market-to-book Market-to-book CDS  Market-to-book Market-to-book CDS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample period  2008  2007 and 2008  2007 and 2008  2008  2007 and 2008  2007 and 2008 
Assets  -0.008 -1.007***  -0.002 -0.002 -0.968***  0.000 
 (0.024)  (0.136)  (0.008)  (0.025) (0.138) (0.004) 
Pre-tax profits  1.336***  -0.754  0.182  1.385***  -0.350  0.033 
 (0.469)  (0.635)  (0.205)  (0.437) (0.631) (0.115) 
Earning  assets  -0.781**  -0.871  -0.141* -0.658* -0.191  -0.024 
 (0.334)  (0.665)  (0.074)  (0.357) (0.718) (0.048) 
Leverage  0.687*** 5.784*** -0.149  0.626*** 5.634*** -0.150** 
 (0.178)  (0.872)  (0.119)  (0.197) (0.877) (0.062) 
GDP per capita  -0.040***  0.229**  0.003  -0.036***  0.205*  0.001 
 (0.014)  (0.113)  (0.004)  (0.012) (0.120) (0.003) 
Past  crisis  0.047    0.019    
  (0.178)    (0.231)    
Past fiscal  cost  -2.471*      -1.942     
  (1.420)    (1.430)    
Public  debt  -0.142 -1.383*  -0.012      
  (0.479) (0.788) (0.055)      
Fiscal balance        -1.135  6.003***  -0.098** 
        (1.454) (2.013) (0.045) 
Bank stock risk  0.303***  -0.243***  0.018*  0.283***  -0.138  0.012** 
 (0.083)  (0.086)  (0.010)  (0.088) (0.090) (0.005) 
  Big0.5  -0.478    -0.384**    
  (0.811)    (0.185)    
Big0.5  *  Public  debt  0.395        46
  (1.325)       
 Big0.5 * Fiscal balance        5.214***     
     (1.727)    
 Big0.5 * Bank stock risk  0.394      0.500     
  (0.577)    (0.394)    
Big0.5,  2007 * Public debt    2.085  0.027       
    (2.159) (0.065)      
 Big0.5, 2007 * Fiscal balance          -1.272  -0.001 
      (6.707)  (0.113) 
 Big0.5, 2007 * Bank stock risk    0.260  -0.013    0.421  -0.006 
    (0.394) (0.011)   (0.440) (0.008) 
Constant  2.987*** 11.654***  0.314*  2.602*** 10.347** 0.098 
 (0.865)  (4.506)  (0.185)  (0.676) (4.519) (0.173) 
N  676 1670  107 642 1,467  91 
R-sq  0.139 0.907 0.889 0.142 0.903 0.959 
Year  fixed  effect  No  Yes Yes No  Yes Yes 
Bank  fixed  effect  No  Yes Yes No  Yes Yes 






Table 10. The impact of systemic bank size as measured by different thresholds for the liabilities-to-GDP ratio 
 
The dependent variable is the market-to-book ratio in columns 1 to 4 and the CDS spread in columns 5 to 8. Market-to-book is the market value of common equity divdided by 
the book value of common equity. CDS is the annual average of daily credit default spreads on a 5-year contract. Assets is natural logarithm of total assets in constant 2000 
US dollars. Pre-tax profits is pre-tax profits divided by total assets. Earning assets is earning assets divided by total assets. Leverage is liabilities divided by total assets.  GDP 
per capita is GDP per capita in constant 2000 dollars. Past crisis is dummy variable that is one if country is not currently experiencing a banking crisis but has experienced a 
banking crisis before and zero otherwise. Past fiscal cost is fiscal cost of resolving most recent but not current banking crisis divided by GDP. Public debt is central 
government debt divided by GDP. Fiscal balance is ratio of central government revenues minus expenses and minus depreciation of capital to GDP. Bank stock risk is 
annualized standard deviation of weekly dividend-inclusive bank stock returns. Big is a dummy variable that equals one if ratio of bank liabilities to GDP exceeds a threshold 
set equal to 0.1 in columns 1 and 5, to 0.25 in columns 2 and 6, to 0.5 in columns 3 and 7, and to 1.0 in columns 4 and 8. All regressions are estimated with year and country 
fixed effects and clustering at the bank level. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
  Market-to-book Market-to-book Market-to-book Market-to-book CDS  CDS  CDS  CDS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Threshold in definition of Big  0.1  0.25  0.5  1  0.1  0.25  0.5  1 
Assets  0.072***  0.072***  0.073***  0.071***  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Pre-tax  profits  3.289***  3.273***  3.271***  3.289***  -0.175 -0.113 -0.132 -0.163 
  (0.896) (0.895) (0.896) (0.896) (0.117)  (0.124)  (0.135)  (0.143) 
Earnings  assets  -0.512***  -0.516***  -0.516***  -0.518***  -0.009 -0.016 -0.015 -0.011 
  (0.195) (0.195) (0.194) (0.195) (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.014) 
Leverage  0.169 0.166 0.173 0.167 0.002  0.011  0.009  0.003 
  (0.230) (0.229) (0.230) (0.229) (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.027) 
GDP  per  capita  0.039 0.037 0.039 0.039 0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Past  crisis  0.004 0.008 0.011 0.002 -0.010**  -0.011**  -0.010**  -0.008* 
  (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Past  fiscal  cost  -0.100 -0.183 -0.147 -0.103 0.333**  0.379**  0.294*  0.223 
  (0.574) (0.580) (0.575) (0.572) (0.139)  (0.173)  (0.152)  (0.138) 
Public  debt  -0.711*** -0.711*** -0.713*** -0.708*** 0.007 0.015 0.002 -0.001 
  (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Bank  stock  risk  0.124* 0.114* 0.120* 0.119* 0.034***  0.033***  0.029***  0.026*** 
  (0.068) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Big  -0.050  -0.252*  -0.380**  -0.416  0.004* 0.004* 0.004**  0.004* 
  (0.105) (0.136) (0.186) (0.341) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Big * Bank stock risk  0.022  0.682**  0.678*  1.242  -0.021***  -0.020**  -0.018**  -0.012* 
  (0.185) (0.287) (0.405) (0.857) (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
N  10791 10791 10791 10791 248  248  248  248  48
R-sq  0.208 0.208 0.209 0.208 0.717  0.683  0.664  0.643 
Country  fixed  effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  fixed  effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 








Table 11. Alternative specifications with respect to public debt and bank risk variables 
  
The dependent variable is the market-to-book ratio in columns 1, 3 and 5, and it is the CDS spread in columns 2, 4 and 6. Market-to-book is the market value of common 
equity divided by the book value of common equity. CDS is the annual average of daily credit default spreads on a 5-year contract. Assets is natural logarithm of total assets in 
constant 2000 US dollars. Pre-tax profits is pre-tax profits divided by total assets. Earning assets is earning assets divided by total assets. Leverage is liabilities divided by total 
assets.  GDP per capita is GDP per capita in constant 2000 dollars. Past crisis is dummy variable that is one if country is not currently experiencing a banking crisis but has 
experienced a banking crisis before and zero otherwise. Past fiscal cost is fiscal cost of resolving most recent but not current banking crisis divided by GDP. Public debt is 
central government debt divided by GDP. Public debt (t-1) is the lagged value of Public debt. Bank stock risk is annualized standard deviation of weekly dividend-inclusive 




ROA is return on assets, CAR represents capital assets ratio and SROA stands for standard deviation of return on assets. Big0.5 is a dummy variable that equals one if ratio of 
bank liabilities to GDP exceeds 0.5 and zero otherwise. All regressions are estimated with year and country fixed effects  and clustering at the bank level. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
  Market-to-book CDS  Market-to-book CDS  Market-to-book CDS 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Assets  0.073*** -0.000  0.073*** -0.000  0.074*** -0.000 
  (0.010) (0.000)  (0.010) (0.000)  (0.010) (0.001) 
Pre-tax  profits  3.271*** -0.132  3.521*** -0.052  3.733*** -0.409* 
  (0.896) (0.135)  (0.978) (0.104)  (1.083) (0.228) 
Earning  assets  -0.516***  -0.015 -0.368*  -0.013 -0.404*  -0.005 
  (0.194) (0.015)  (0.202) (0.019)  (0.214) (0.024) 
Leverage  0.173 0.009  0.177 0.002  0.087 -0.025 
  (0.230) (0.026)  (0.237) (0.028)  (0.259) (0.035) 
GDP per capita  0.036  0.000  0.041  0.000  0.043*  0.001 
  (0.024) (0.001)  (0.027) (0.002)  (0.025) (0.002) 
Past  Crisis  0.011 -0.010**  0.003 -0.009*  0.026 -0.005 
  (0.049) (0.005)  (0.043) (0.005)  (0.050) (0.005) 
Past fiscal  cost  -0.147  0.294*  -0.549  0.229*  -0.350  0.123 
  (0.575) (0.152)  (0.568) (0.123)  (0.552) (0.137) 
Public  debt        -0.703***  0.000 
        (0.110)  (0.009) 
Residual public debt  -0.713***  0.002         
  (0.109)  (0.010)       
Public debt (t-1)      -0.670***  -0.004     
     (0.103)  (0.005)    
Bank  stock  risk  0.120*  0.029*** 0.080  0.029***     50
  (0.067) (0.008)  (0.069) (0.009)     
Z-score        -0.001  -0.000 
        (0.001)  (0.000) 
Big0.5  -0.380**  0.004** -0.342  0.005** -0.083  -0.001 
  (0.186) (0.002)  (0.215) (0.002)  (0.200) (0.003) 
Big0.5 * Bank stock risk  0.678*  -0.018**  0.682*  -0.018**     
  (0.405) (0.007)  (0.411) (0.007)     
Big0.5 * Z-score          -0.004  -0.000 
        (0.008)  (0.000) 
N  10791  248 9225  226 10221  239 
R-sq  0.209 0.664  0.224 0.682  0.207 0.542 
Year  fixed  effect  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Country  fixed  effect  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Clustering  Level  Bank Bank  Bank Bank  Bank Bank 
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Figure 1. Percentages of systemically large banks during 1991-2008 
 
This figures shows the percentages of banks with a liabilities-to-GDP ratio exceeding various thresholds. Specifically, Big0.1 displays the percentage of banks 
with a liabilities-to-GDP ratio exceeding 0.1. Big0.25 displays the percentage of banks with a liabilities-to-GDP ratio exceeding 0.25. Big0.5 displays the 
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